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Near East/North Africa Report

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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COMMENTATOR ANALYZES CURRENT GULF COALITION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 13, 20 Jun 81

/Article by Riyad Najibal-Rayyis: "A Period of Distress: Relaxation in the Gulf and Sorrow in the Arab World"/

/13 Jun 81 pp 30, 31/

/Text/ How did the Arab's sorrow begin and when the relaxation in the Arab Gulf end?

The end came with the intense applause people heard in Abu Dhabi when the Gulf Cooperation Council met officially last 26 May. The beginning took place when the people at the conference breathed a deep sigh over the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council had officially met and had come to possess a legal identity with which it could protect itself.

Any reading on the joint Gulf working paper appended to the concluding statement of the first meeting of the higher council (Gulf Summit) of the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf States will show the ambitiousness to which the people of the Gulf aspired. It is their greatest, most historic aspiration of this era.

Because it is a voluntary one, an ambition without a hero, it is a difficult one, as was its birth. The historic caesarean birth passed through numerous stages which threatened the continual health of the fetus, and the same stages are still threatening the health of the newborn infant. What, however, are these stages?

Between the Muscat and Abu Dhabi conferences, the 1,000-mile journey began with two steps:

First, the statement made at the Muscat meeting by those in attendance, specifically between Kuwait and Oman, on international political relations and the security problems arising from them.

Second, the assignment the conference gave the Sultanate of Oman, as a consequence of this statement, to prepare a security paper declaring the strategic notions and dangers hanging over the region for presentation at the Abu Dhabi Conference. When the Abu Dhabi Conference was held, the cards were shuffled again and the battle of priorities began.

These priorities became clear before the conference split up into two distinct blocs:

One bloc, consisting of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, which wanted to discuss and give priority to security issues.

A bloc consisting of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates which wanted to keep security issues out at this stage and concentrate first on the need to establish the Cooperation Council as an organization, without preconditions, with discussion to take place on all issues subsequently: the umbrella first, then the rain. Qatar, in its neutrality leaned toward the former bloc; Bahrain leaned toward the latter one in its political heart and to the former one in its economic heart.

At the end of the Muscat Conference and the start of the one in Abu Dhabi Oman's priorities stressed security. How to explain that? Oman's position could be summarized in the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council would remain deficient if it was not concerned with security aspects. If the justifications for forming it were purely economic, Oman did not want to preoccupy itself with them in spite of their importance. Therefore it bluntly told more than one body that if those at the conference ducked a discussion of strategic security matters or watered it down, it might find itself free not to remain in the council. This is the point it raised in the conference when it presented the strategic security paper the Muscat Conference had assigned to it but which met with no response. Those at the conference, rather, wanted it to remain without discussing Omani conceptions of Gulf security at this particular conference. They did not want to link the establishment of the cooperation council, as a framework for joint action, with Oman's detailed political strategic demands, to which scope could be given at a subsequent conference. The procedural issue was more important to some of those at the conference than the security one.

The Sultanate of Oman wanted to link the security issue to the establishment of the Cooperation Council and wanted a discussion to take place on the strategic action paper it had presented (or conception, which was the expression for it), so that it would be a supplement to the council's charter. Kuwait believed that the security issue was complicated and that it was not permissible to link it to establishment of the Cooperation Council as it could be discussed at a later time, in the council context, after it was formed. These two notions clashed inside the summit meeting in the course of 2 days, until they produced the conclusion that discussion of the security issue was not a condition for endorsing the establishment of the council; at the same time the Gulf leaders, in their concluding statement, underlined the importance of Gulf security as one of the most important priority matters in common Gulf action. The conference emerged from the procedural dilemma only to fall into the security one.

Proceeding from this resolution, Sultan Qaboos ibn Sa'id, the Sultan of Oman, demanded the floor at the concluding session, in which he underlined his country's position by saying "We will have to stress the need to concentrate the bulk of our interest and our effort on maintenance of the security and stability of our

region if we want to provide the proper atmosphere for cooperation among our countries." As Sultan Qabus was making this diplomatic statement, his country's broadcasting service in Muscat was stating things more directly and specifically. It pointed out that Oman was "unique relative to the other countries in the council in its specific quality, which was its geographical location. Its destiny has determined that it would be the gateway to the Gulf and consequently that Oman would be the guardian of this gateway in circumstances when many outsiders were trying to generate it." The radio commentary continued, "The Omani working paper refers to the need for the six countries to coordinate their military and security efforts in order to avoid likely dangers. Economic power alone is not enough; it will continue to be threatened as long as there is no defense force to protect it."

Radio Muscat, in its commentary, did not forget indirectly to remind the listeners, indeed those at the conference, of Sultan Qabus' interview with AL-HUSTHAMI in which he propounded the idea of joining NATO. This the Omani broadcast described at some length, stressing "the priority of countries in the area now must be on acquiring military power. The countries of the European Common Market, which was started as a first step along the road to the attainment of political unity, joined together in a defensive pact, the North Atlantic Treaty." In its position, Oman continued to reject the other viewpoint, which was that first economic power must be acquired and then would come the acquisition of security power, stressing that priority should go to the security situation.

The difference and dispute over priorities between Oman and its neighbors, the other countries, did not stop at strategic-security views, but went beyond them to the overall Arab situation. Three of the foreign ministers at the conference had just returned from Tunisia after the emergency conference Algeria had called to support the Syrian position in the missile crisis with Israel and when the Gulf Conference tried to declare its support and backing for Syria, the sultanate asked those at the conference to declare similar support and backing for Iraq in its war with Iran. The pressure from Oman resulted in a nearly balanced position on the council's part in its concluding statement on the two crises and the two countries.

The Tunisian emergency conference to discuss the Syrian-Israeli crisis almost caused a problem before the Gulf Cooperation Council was convened. Invitations were sent out for the former conference to meet on Friday 22 May -- just 24 hours before the date of the convening of the Ministerial Council of the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Gulf circles considered that an Arab attempt to torpedo the Gulf conference by squeezing the Tunisian Conference into the narrowest of time frames, making travel for the Gulf foreign ministers difficult. Arab circles also considered that the tardiness of the Gulf foreign ministers could be considered tantamount to a rejection of the priorities of Arab action. The consensus was that Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the foreign minister of Kuwait, and Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal, foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, should represent the six Gulf Cooperation Council states at the Arab nations' Foreign Ministers' conference in Tunisia while the others busied themselves preparing for the Abu Dhabi summit. The official GULF NEWS AGENCY announced this item of news from Bahrain and the Gulf newspapers and broadcasting services all disseminated it on Wednesday 20 May. It was the first time the

Gulf states were represented as a bloc in any Arab or foreign conference and Arab reservations subsequently began to arise. Then the following day Qatar decided to send its minister of state for foreign affairs, Shaykh Khalid ibn Sayf Al al-Thani, and the state of the emirates decided to send its deputy foreign minister, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jarwan, to Tunis, while both Bahrain and Oman contented themselves with assigning their ambassadors to Tunisia and permanent representatives in the Arab League to represent their countries.

Arab opposition to the united Gulf delegation was based on four points:

First, the Council on Gulf Cooperation had not yet officially been established and its charter made no reference to common foreign representation, even under the pressure of circumstances of time.

Second, the delegation could be interpreted as the start of a Gulf shift toward regional issues, giving joint Arab action, represented by the common Palestinian-Syrian-Lebanese issue, second place in importance.

Third, the Gulf countries remain sovereign states, are sensitive about having joint representation, are generally afraid of embarrassing Arab countries which have bilateral relations with them and do not want to lead them to believe that these relations have changed.

Fourth, giving great credibility to Arab statements which have begun to circulate to the effect that the Gulf Cooperation Council will compete with the Arab League and thus that the Arab League will not enjoy the traditional support it had received from the Gulf states.

Therefore the Gulf states hastened to provide an Arab and Islamic veneer for their new council. Chedli Klibi, the secretary general of the Arab League, came and gave a speech at the inaugural session of the Abu Dhabi summit, declaring the league's blessings and stressing that that group was not incompatible with the league charter. In addition, Habib Chatti, secretary general of the Islamic Conference, came and declared similar support for the Gulf Cooperation Council, stressing its importance as a bloc inside the Islamic world and blessing its steps and its efforts.

The quick visit by King Husayn, ruler of Jordan, to the Gulf states bore all these Arab concerns. It occured a few days before the convening of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Gulf Summit in Abu Dhabi, and preceded the convening of the Tunisia emergency conference. Coming before Husayn's visit to Moscow, it laid before the need for Arab solidarity at the Tunisia conference and the agenda of his discussions with Brezhnev. King Husayn spoke to the Gulf leaders bluntly. He told them that the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Countil was provoking fears in Jordan, which was linked by especially strong bonds with individual Gulf states. Jordan had offered them all the support and expertise it possessed when asked to do so. Therefore, Jordan felt that it was almost surrounded by groups of blocs. There was the bloc of the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front, there was the Maghreb bloc, and there was the current bloc of Egypt and the Sudan. Jordan had poor relations

with Syria and cool ones with the Palestinians. Then, today, it was faced with the unity of the new Gulf bloc, and, for this reason, Jordan was suffering more harm than anyone.

King Hussayn said that he was ready, on his visit to Moscow, to bring up with Brezhnev the need for the Soviet Union to take a positive stand on the new Gulf bloc, if the Gulf Cooperation Council displayed balance in its foreign relations. King Hussayn advised that it was necessary to think seriously of establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow and take practical steps toward that if the Gulf countries wanted to keep the struggle between the great powers out of their area. He said that he was prepared to play an intermediary role in building bridges with the Soviet Union and that he considered this necessary. Up to the time these lines were written, the Soviet Union has not taken a frankly hostile position toward the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Prior to that Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, the foreign minister of Kuwait, had, on his visit to Moscow in April, raised with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, the need for the Soviet Union to establish an attitude toward the Gulf Cooperation Council which was friendly and not hostile, in order to encourage the states in the council to adopt a neutral position vis-a-vis the United States and the West. Gromyko gave Shaykh Sabah a statement to the effect that the Soviet Union could not adopt a position on the Gulf Cooperation Council before it was officially established and proclaimed its political and security intentions. In addition, there was at that time a possibility that the council would not be established as a body and that Oman or Kuwait would withdraw from it; consequently, it was not possible for the Soviet Union to take a position in advance on a matter whose features were still unclear. King Hussayn's visit to Moscow complemented Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad's visit in informing the Soviets of the developments of matters and keeping the lines with them open, in hopes that would prevent them from taking a blatantly hostile position toward the council while it was still starting out in life.

Therefore the subject of relations with Moscow received serious attention among Gulf Cooperation Council states and the discussion of diplomatic relations between the Gulf states and the Soviet Union came to have as much priority to Kuwait (which alone has relations with Moscow) as the security issue has to Oman. In addition, it also became clear that a coordinated position regarding these two important issues was being worked out between the two major parties within the Council on Cooperation -- the Saudi-Omani party, which gave maximum importance to Gulf security, and the party of Kuwait and the emirates, which gave greater importance to the idea of neutrality between the two superpowers and the establishment of relations with Moscow. Herein lies the future struggle between Gulf countries -- inside the context of the Cooperation Council rather than outside it, however.

As all this is happening, the time, in the words of Shaykh Ahmad ibn Mubarak al-Khalifah, foreign minister of Bahrain, has come, to embrace a policy of realism in the Gulf region and to refrain from constantly making promises that cannot be met. The Gulf states need not resolve all their issues in one meeting or at one time. The opportunities are just beginning and it is just the beginning of the

road. This is specifically a council of cooperation. It gives economics priority over politics, in the words of 'Abdallah Bishara, the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In particular, /its members/ remain countries possessing sovereignty and have complete freedom to adopt or attach themselves to any political position. They are countries which all enjoy equal representation. There is no fear of Saudi hegemony, for example; it is the biggest country but always responds to the desires of the others. The same holds for Kuwait, which has a domestic situation distinguished by parliamentary democracy and a foreign position which is unique on account of its relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Oman, which turned its back on the Arabian Peninsula for half a century, is now, with all its fears and aspirations, returning to play a fundamental role in Gulf and Arab cooperation. There are the emirates, with their fragile domestic composition, between Abu Dhabi's Arab ambitions and Arab aspirations and Dubai's greed and commercial-mercantile aspirations. No voice is louder than any other.

If we accept, for the sake of argument, as 'Abdallah Bishara would like to persuade us, that the Gulf Cooperation Council is not a political organization that nothing in its charter refers to that, and that economics and economic coordination are its only priorities, this means that full Gulf rejoicing will be postponed to the next conference in Riyadh and the presentation of expressions of Arab grief will be postponed until every Gulf conference, no matter how small.

There must be an end to Arab pride and a beginning to Gulf ambition!

/20 Jun 81 pp 28, 29/

/Text/ He has a lively intelligence, a sharp mind, a brilliant, engaging personality and interesting, compelling conversation. He boasts constantly of being a scion of Arab pirates who plowed the Arab Gulf with their boats, riding the shores and shallow waters and standing up to dominance by the fleets of foreign nations and their major companies during the 18th and 19th centuries. He is proud to be the scion of this elite of intellectuals and educated people in the Gulf, which he mockingly calls "Anglo-bedouin." He talks with rapture about his Arab pirate forebears and how they stood up to foreign designs along the shores of the Arabian Peninsula until fortunes changed. He acknowledges that "some of the instinct of the pirate" is still in their blood, and that is one of the reasons for their perseverance and success up to this point.

At the outset I will confess that I am attracted to him and have been a good listener of his for more than 15 years. I will also confess that this article bears his ideas, and nothing of mine is in it except the formulation. On top of that I will confess that I do not share many of his ideas, although I do not conceal my amazement at them. In addition I will confess that I do not have the power to disclose his identity, for a number of simple reasons: first, because he asked this of me, with some embarrassment. He is a man in power who does not want to embarrass his country or his colleagues in power. Second, because he wants this statement to remain an intellectual conception of future days in the Gulf, not an official political stand. And because, ultimately, most of the peoples who are knowledgeable about Gulf affairs surely realize who he is. He is one of the brilliant people from that small, poor Gulf country which has been known as the wellspring of true men.

Our conversation began in the midst of the tea cups that had been accumulating on the meeting table, as I constantly recalled him how the Gulf Cooperation Council was by its nature developing at the expense of the Palestinian cause, adding a new axis to the many existing ones in the Arab world.

He said, "Why do you want the Gulf to be a battlefront? Why do you want its countries always to bear the burden of the Palestinian confrontation? Why do the other Arabs have the right to fight amongst themselves, at a far remove from Palestine, while the countries in the Gulf do not have the right to reach agreement with one another? Why is a greater price always being asked of us than the real price of the cause, of which the other Arabs ought to be bearing a bigger portion? Name to me one instance when the countries of the Gulf have abandoned the Palestinian cause!"

He didn't give me the change to follow up with a new question, but followed through on his statement, rather, by saying, "Let's stay on the subject of the Palestinie issue awhile. The Arabs are suddenly afraid the people in the Gulf are going to turn their back on it, having turned their back on it themselves for a quarter century. Tell me, in two words, what the Arab Gulf represents vis-a-vis the world. Oil and money. Since that is the case, the Gulf can, as a single bloc, in a single formula, negotiate better with the world through its oil and its money and better impose it's conditions for the sake of that cause than six countries with diverse policies, caprices and characteristics bowing in different directions to specific well known pressures can benefit the cause about which the Arabs are concerned.

I told him, taking advantage of the fact that he paused to drink some of the tea in front of him, "But don't you admit that the Council on Gulf Cooperation will weaken the Arab League and its identity?"

With the cup of tea still at his lips, he said, "The Arab world has tried the Arab League approach for more than 30 years, and what has it got? An absolute minimum which adds to no one's prosperity and relieves no one's hunger. That is the style of the United Nations, the style of halfway solutions, the style of voting unanimously. The Arab League has failed. Why? For many reasons. The first is that the world, including the Arab world, has become very large and interdependent, losing its traditional economic and political independence. Consequently, countries in the world are no longer sealed-off islands which are able to live alone. Moreover, every Arab state has neighbors who differ with it or are against it and burden it down with worries. Would you like a long list of them? Write: Morocco and Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, North Yemen and South Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Egypt and the Sudan — indeed Egypt and the whole Arab world today. Shall I go on spelling out this long list?"

He did not go on. Rather, he continued his statement: "Every problem in these countries is connected to a country outside the Arab framework. The problem of Libya and Chad is connected to France. The problem of Somalia and Ethiopia is connected to Cuba. The problem of North Yemen and South Yemen is connected to the Soviet Union. The problem of Syria and Iraq is connected, today, to Iran. The problem of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon is connected to the Palestinians. Indeed, the whole problem of Palestine is connected to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe — indeed, to the whole world.

"So there is no problem that stands by itself apart from foreign elements. However, other Arabs do not have any connection with these bilateral problems. The Gulf has no connection for example to the Chad question. The Gulf is not a party to the Western Sahara problem. The Gulf has no position on the dispute between Syria and Iraq. Rather, they have one common problem which is organically related to all these problems, and that is the Palestine cause alone. Therefore every issue requires separate contacts with a non-Arab party, but the Gulf cannot talk with France about Chad, with the Soviet Union about Somalia, with Iran about Iraq, or even with the Lebanese about Syria. It can just talk with the United States, Western Europe and some countries in the industrial world about the Palestine cause as an Arab problem. Si we that is the case, it will have a stronger, more effective voice as a regional bloc possessing oil and money. Then it will be preoccupying itself with the Palestine cause in terms of a real commitment because the whole future of the relations between the Gulf and the Western world depends on this cause."

My friend from the Gulf paused a little to relax, not expecting any interruption from me that might sever the thread of his ideas. He continued to speak: "Let us distance ourselves slightly from political comparisons and deal with economic relations, with Europe for example. The Maghreb produces wine. The eastern Arab world produces grain and citrus fruit. Egypt, the Sudan and the Nile valley produce cotton. Iraq produces dates. The Arab Gulf produces oil. Each one of these products requires a separate relationship with Europe, a separate meeting with the European Common Market, a special agreement with importing or consuming countries. Until there is economic integration, the Arab League will not be able to handle that.

"Therefore we go back to the notion of regional groupings. The Gulf Cooperation Council will provide us, that is, the people of the Gulf, with economic coordination in conditions of equality and will give us greater negotiating pressure, through which we will be able to impose greater gains for ourselves. We therefore insist that the groupings on which the Gulf Cooperation Council stands be economic and start with economic issues. Therefore we consider ourselves, or aspire, to be the southern states of the Arabs' America, as Texas has been within the United States of America. Arab integration starts with regional integration. Our regional integration in the Gulf and our common economic, social and political structure will be the basis. We have not weakened the Arab League and have had no interest in doing so. The weakening of the Arab League has basically been caused by the regional struggles inside the Arab bloc. When half the league, namely Egypt, vanished, the Gulf felt that it had to search itself and examine its security, so that we could break the noose of the historic Western sleep around us, a sleep which can be summarized in one sentence: protection against development and immunity against death -- that is, everything preventing us from progressing while ensuring that our backwardness is not fatal. We do not want to end up the way the kings of tribes did in Arab history. Among them were men who passed away and men who are waiting to do so. The formation of geographical blocs is acceptable in the Arab League Charter, and we are not Arab separatists. A wise voice is louder and greater than all the little voices of disunity."

My Gulf friend fell quiet a moment and rubbed his forehead with his fingers as if he was pressing against a headache that had been bothering him. He gazed at me closely with a certain air of challenge and said, "We people of the Gulf have to make a matter clear once and for all so that no doubts or questions will be raised in the future. There will be no stability, no security and no welfare for the countries of the Gulf unless the Palestine cause is resolved honorably. That's understood. The Palestinian cause will be resolved today only by two fluids: blood and oil. They must be merged. Oil is the cheaper fluid — that's understood. That is, any regional Arab grouping, be it in the Gulf, the Maghreb, the Arab East or the Nile, that does not place the Palestine cause in its list of priorities, will face instant ruin. That is understood. We, the people of the Gulf, are a party to the priority this cause enjoys."

Before my Gulf friend could tell me "that's understood," I hastened to ask him, "But how can these two fluids be merged, and by what means? He smiled and said, "Oil is cheaper than blood and has a higher API. However, they must flow together at one instant so that they can impart the requisite power to arrive at a decisive resolution to the cause. We cut off the oil and sacrifice it while you fight and sacrifice your lives. Don't ask me how — I do not know, nor does anyone else. What I do know is that each of us must sacrifice what he has, indeed the most precious thing he has. This must be our commitment to the Arab world and to its great cause. Ten thousand Israeli troops alone are capable of threatening the Arabian Peninsula, if not to occupy it. What will the Arab League and its paralyzed Egyptian half do for us? Nothing. Therefore we realize that we in the Arabian Peninsula will not sleep peacefully until the world comes up with a just, honorable resolution to this cause. Do you believe that Egypt, which has gone out of the Arab League, will be able to solve its problems before a solution to the Palestinian cause is reached? This is Sadatist shortsightedness. al-Sadat thought that by acting alone, without finding a solution to the cause, he would be able to arrange the affairs of his Egyptian home but not even the most trivial Egyptian affairs will be resolved before the central cause is. Departing from the Arab League will not protect you from the vicissitudes of the Arab world or solve your local problems. Rather, it will expose you to new afflictions."

For a brief time, silence dominated the room. I tried to break the silence with a question on the means for making these two liquids, blood and oil, flow together, while the Gulf countries were unable to rid themselves of the special relationship with America, which makes that difficult if not impossible.

He gazed at me again after calling for more tea, and said, "The relationship between the Arabs and America has nothing to do with the availability of these two liquids and the extent to which their commingling is effective. Since World War Two, this relationship has been possessed by the Israeli question. The reason is our deficiency in thinking. In addition, the Arab-American relationship has since the end of World War Two been dictated by three things:

"First, the Arab world, and the Arabian Peninsula in particular, is an American zone, according to the Yalta Agreement.

"Second, the survival of Israel within the Arab world has become a vital matter as far as America goes.

"Third, the existence of oil on Arab territories, and the need America and the industrial countries have for it, has caused American policy in the Arab world to consist of two parallel lines, an Israeli line and an oil line, which consequently makes defense of the oil as important as the defense of Israel.

"The Arabs have not grasped these rules and have not learned how to cope with them. Israel has taken advantage of all the variables in international conditions in order to incite American and Western public opinion against the Arabs. Israel has played a single game. If an Arab scholar or inventor becomes prominent, he is a Syrian, a Lebanese or a Palestinian. If any criminal is arrested he is an Arab. If an Arab achievement takes place, it is an Egyptian, Saudi or Jordanian achievement; if a terrorist act takes place, it is Arab. Israel has played the game of generalization. It attributes the good things to an Arab country; the bad things are all Arab.

"In Germany, the Arabs are a neglected third world. In Bangladesh, the Arabs are Muslims. In the Middle East, the Arabs are Palestinians. The Arabs have not learned how to take advantage of these three situations, but Israel has learned how to describe us to its benefit and stir American and Western public opinion against us. If America has a dispute with Cuba, we are Havana's allies against Washington, by virtue of the fact that we are in the neglected bloc. If America has a dispute with Iran, we are on Tehran's side because we are Muslims. If America has a dispute with India, we are on New Delhi's side because we are part of the third world. If America has a dispute with the Soviet Union in the Middle East, we are on Moscow's side because we are Palestinians. So Israel has managed to put us in any category it wants, according to the circumstances of American public opinion, and we have not been able to use our numerous positions with the people who run things in these countries to benefit our cause."

My dull friend continued talking. "You ask me what we can do if we cannot declare war tomorrow or cut the oil off the day after tomorrow, if the international powers do not permit the kidnapping of blood and oil in a single struggle. I have only one simplistic answer, but in my opinion it is a practical one: the Arabs should break off relations with America the way China did. For more than a quarter century, China closed the door to America, until the international balance changed, the time came and the United States realized that it needed the millions of people in China to buy technology, arms, food and so on and so forth from it.

"The solution is simple. The Arabs will boycott America economically, in a gradual fashion, and play the two camps against each other from inside the unified Western camp. We will sell America oil at its current price but also sell it cheaper to Europe and Japan and buy nothing from America, nothing in America, the likes of which are available abroad. We will buy arms and technology from Europe and act flexibly with oil prices when Europe deals flexibly with us on the political scene. We will buy from Japan, buy from Korea and China, buy from the Soviet Union, buy from the free market but not buy from the United States or spend 1 piaster in the American market. We will invest our money everywhere,

in Australia, New Zealand, in Zimbabwe, but not in America. We will do this gradually, without noise, announcements or tumult, until America feels the Arabs' economic teeth starting to gnaw at its empty stomach. I will not be overtly hostile to America, strike out at its interests in my presence, hamper its extension or provoke it, lest I give it a military or political pretext for engaging me and striking out at me. Ultimately America will have to turn toward me and ask me what I want. Then alone will America realize that its interests lie with me and in my presence and that its economic interests and life blood depend on the attainment of a just, honorable resolution to my cause. At that point alone we will have touched the most holy of America's holy assets, the economic interests, and it will have understood!"

My Gulf friend collected his thoughts — he had no papers in front of him — and looks me forward, saying "however, protection against development and immunity against death do not mean life." We want to live and reach the stars as others have. We have all the attributes that qualify us to live, except for the courage of our ideas. Sow some of these seeds in the ground, even in a wasteland, and the rain will have to touch some of them and give them the courage to live."

I left my Gulf friend and stood along the coast of that shallow sea, looking toward its horizon, in hopes that I might see one of the vessels of his Arab pirate forefathers that had the courage to stand up to the fleets of the big powers. I saw not a single sail in range along the Gulf.

And I was sad.

1180?
CSD: 6304/95

IRAQ, SYRIA SAID TO BE READY TO [illegible] TIES

London AL HAYAT in English No 23, 27 Jun 91 p 16

[Article by Helena Cobban]

[Text]

[illegible] and Syrian-Iraq [illegible] Iraq after the recent Israeli attacks on Syria, but does that mean that the two Baathist governments are [illegible] closing ranks?

Such a move could bring radically the balance of power in the region in a direction in the state level in which regards the [illegible] of Iraq's foreign relationships in [illegible] back in 1970.

Iraq President Saddam Hussein might use the recent in the space with [illegible] to [illegible] to Syria. Such regards that [illegible] to make [illegible] to the Syrians. These regards [illegible] Arab regions described in some detail the step by step programme of [illegible] presented to the Iraqis after [illegible] regarding Arab League Secretary-General Chedli Klibi's [illegible].

Two indications of Iraq [illegible] the region up, [illegible] with an Iraq office in [illegible] has told the Iranian level of Iraq trade payment through the Syrian position in the Mediterranean [illegible] to [illegible] the days are past to have the [illegible] payment, the hard-pressed Syrian exchequer could [illegible].

As [illegible] might the Iraqis, whose [illegible] regions are still occupied by the Gulf War [illegible] of their own are [illegible] at the end of the Gulf. But the prospect of Iraq [illegible] with Syria in Iraq's [illegible] will [illegible] a [illegible] Baghdad [illegible] the political [illegible].

Syrian officials say the Iraqis proposed a series of steps. The propaganda war between the two regimes would be halted; their [illegible] would [illegible]; [illegible] might have [illegible] the [illegible] that further [illegible] measures would be taken each [illegible] the problem.

The Syrian [illegible] agreed to all this. But they did not agree to a total Iraq proposal that before any of the above steps were taken the two governments should publicly declare that [illegible] problems between them had been solved and relations completely normalized to all regions short of total war. At this point regions from Iraq say Hafez Assad's government hesitated. He reportedly argued that one should be the total war, and the first step was just the problems raised by the Iraqis. But all outstanding problems between the two governments, should be resolved before any such declaration were made. Thus the Syrian had should exclude the question of changing the wording of the Baghdadis, long a point of contention.

At this stage the negotiations apparently broke down. Even the plans to [illegible] the packaging of Iraq oil through Iraq were halted. The political [illegible] from the Syrian regime was that Assad felt stopped the negotiations going ahead. At that time, back in May, Assad was just starting to map the political [illegible] of the rough [illegible] in the [illegible]. Possibly he felt [illegible] enough with the new

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

OPEC PRICING POLICY DISCUSSED

London ARAB in English No 21, 13 Jan 81 p 48

(Text) [illegible] the next 18 months while they reformulate their long-term pricing plans. Dr Mana al Otaiba, the U.A.E. minister of petroleum and mineral resources, said in London last week at an energy conference organized by the U.K. *Financial Times*.

Oil prices were close to a reasonable level and perhaps Opec should take it easy [illegible] for applying further increases, he said. His contribution provoked a rise in current thinking on pricing policies among the more moderate members of Opec. Oil ministers recently agreed in Vienna that prices should remain at present levels, or [illegible] the next scheduled meeting in Abu Dhabi in December. Dr al Otaiba said he wished to go further and freeze the price until the end of next year.

He indicated that Opec might be able to achieve pricing unity by the end of next year. It is thought in the oil industry that this could be achieved by Saudi Arabia raising its $32 marker price closer to the $36 reference price adopted by other Opec members.

A unified pricing structure is regarded as Opec's prerequisite for the adoption of a long-term pricing strategy, under which tariffs would not probably be tied with world economic growth and inflation. Under the original long-term strategy proposals, prices would have risen on average 2 or 3 per cent a year in real terms through the 1980s and 1990s. But these proposals were formulated when the average oil price was around $20 a barrel.

Dr al Otaiba pointed out that Opec ministers had called for a revision of the proposed strategy. I had personally no (Opec) need make time to think specifically whether it is right now to think that a price of $32 to $40 a barrel is very close to being reasonable.

A price freeze to the end of next year would give the whole world a chance to [illegible] and also a chance for us to design our long-term strategy which hopefully would stop any sharp decrease in the price of oil, as in 1979.

Past price increases had stimulated a process [illegible] officers to [illegible] consumption. There had also been a movement towards the greater use of alternative energy forms. The U.A.E. he said, as an Opec member with large oil reserves, was concerned to see a healthy oil market leaving in the hand of the owners and beyond. The U.A.E. did not want a situation in which its oil would not find a buyer. He concluded, however, that not all Opec ministers agreed with his pricing philosophy.

Other conference speakers included John Lichtblau, executive director of Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, New York. He said a move by Opec to raise oil prices by a further significant amount in real terms would prove to be counter-productive particularly for those countries with large crude oil reserves.

There was already strong evidence to

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARAB BANKS TAKE STEPS AGAINST HIGH U.S. INTEREST RATES

London A DATF in English No 25, 27 Jun 81 p 34

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] CENTRAL BANKS in Kuwait and the UAE have introduced stringent regulations to control the number of funds attracted by the high US interest rates.

The newly formed UAE Central Bank exercised its authority last last month by introducing a penal deposit system. This requires banks which hold dirhams in their resident bank his three months or less to deposit 15 per cent of such sum with the Central Bank — and these deposits earn no interest.

The Kuwait Central Bank has decided that in will not dollar [illegible] for commercially based transactions. The bank has been pumping money into the market in order to avert liquidity crunches. In banking circles it is rumoured that the monetary of Kuwait has been moving large sums of fund in order to keep it liquidity at acceptable levels.

When US interest rates rose to 19.25 per cent in mid April, investors in the Gulf naturally began to put their short term funds in the dollar. The dollar rate, compared with that of the dirham or 10.5 per cent, naturally made the dollar an attractive investment for both expatriate and Arab investors, said John Carey, manager of Barclays International in Dubai.

The strange reasons of commercial banks in the UAE. Qatar and Kuwait was whether the investment into dollars would cause problems for the local currencies.

According to reports from bankers in Doha, the flight of funds has left many Qatari banks dry of capital and it has forced at least one to asking foreign bank to close its local positions.

Bankers in Qatar are dismayed at the lack of liquid funds, and in one case, it is impossible for us to conduct business, when we have to borrow at about 17 per cent and lend at no more than 9.5 per cent. Qatari local deposits have reached the stage of non-growth, say bankers.

The Qatar Monetary Agency so far has not intervened, although it has been widely reported that some banks in order to survive, have been floating the borrowing and lending bases of 7 per cent and 9.5 per cent respectively, the agency ceiling. To prevent departures, bankers have been adopting underhand methods of offering 9 per cent above the ceiling rate.

In the UAE, there was concern that the swap arrangements between the Central Bank and commercial banks might be discontinued, thus leading to shortage of liquidity. The Central Bank quickly announced that it would continue to swap US dollars for dirhams in an effort to maintain easy availability of local currency in the country. The Central Bank is prepared to buy normal amounts of US dollars from commercial banks to prevent

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CHANGING ROLES, ATTITUDES OF WOMEN EXAMINED

Manama AL-AYAM in Arabic 9 Jun 81 p 7

[Interview with Miss Widad al-Mougati of the Bahrain Women's Progress Society by 'Isa Hilal: "A Face and an Opinion: The Ministry of Labor Does not Have the Right To Choose a Candidate for the Societies; the Veil Is a Phenomenon Alien to the Spirit of the Age"]

[Text] Major hopes are hanging on the role of the women's movement in Bahrain, a movement that has made good and purposeful progress in the area and is now celebrating 25 years of feminist action. We believe that the time has come for crystallizing ideas and for collective coordination regarding the existing societies. [We believe that the time has come] for turning towards new horizons to bring about creative feminist accomplishments that would serve the material world of objective and subjective conditions for the establishment of a feminist world that is more solid and would bring about the goals that are being hoped for. This week, our column, "A Face and an Opinion," hosts a female personality who is still contributing to the establishment of a better material world. She is Miss Widad al-Mougati from the Bahrain Women's Progress Society, 1975 B.S. in commerce and economics from the University of Kuwait.

25 Years

At the outset Miss Widad spoke about the Bahrain Women's Progress Society, saying, "The society was established in 1955, that is 25 years ago. It played its part in organizing the women's movement in Bahrain, and it contributed appropriately in raising the consciousness of Bahrain women. However, this role has been governed by conditions known to women's societies in Bahrain. I can say that the current activity of the society is concentrated in the social field. The society offers common services for working women, [including] nurseries, kindergartens and [efforts] to eradicate illiteracy. The society began this project in 1962, and it is [still involved in it]. It is now managing the [Barbar] illiteracy center [and conducting] consciousness raising campaigns for rural women."

[Question] What about the nature of your cultural works?

[Answer] We began working on preparations for this activity last year which coincided with the society's sixth anniversary. This was when the society's first cultural week was held. Ever since then, we have been trying to make the members of the society prepare for and take part in such weeks. We have also been trying to overcome some of the gaps in this area, such as the weakness of some subjects in the process of selecting and creating the women from the society who would assume the responsibility of getting up such cultural weeks.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the cultural week which was held recently by the society?

[Answer] This was an evaluation of some kind of last year's cultural week, such as an attempt to avoid mistakes and to get the members used to being creative, innovative and prepared. I believe that the reason for the failure of some of the cultural weeks which were presented by other societies and organizations was the absence of leadership elements for these activities. As women's societies we lack--as do other societies--the enlightenment, the conditioning and the development [required for] such activities. Everyone has been accustomed to receiving instead of giving. There is no doubt that [some] inadequacy on the part of some societies does exist and that the members of the societies have to offer something creative instead of being on the receiving end. The excuse for this lies in the fact that most of the members of the societies are housewives with little education. We need much time and effort to overcome this.

[Question] What do you say about the range of your relationship with the other societies?

[Answer] Our relations with them are relatively good, and we are hoping that they will be better and on greater levels. We do in fact need consultation and cooperation to create a strong background on which we can stand so we can offer better things than what is now available. In my view we, as a society, are aspiring to develop our relations with the other national societies and organizations. We have the same goal, and the method [we use] must be a common method.

[Question] What is the central question or problem for women in Bahrain?

[Answer] There is more than one question. The problem of the status of women in the family remains [the central question]. The present status of women is unsuitable in view of the fact that women are human beings whose rights are as far as large as their responsibilities. There is [the problem of] women's treatment in the family as actual human beings with [a sense of] being and independence; there is [the problem of] society's view of women; and there is [the problem of] family control of women.

[Question] What in your opinion are the roots of this?

[Answer] Family control of women and the economic problem and the role that problems play in the subordination of women is [a result of the fact

that] man is in control economically, and he is the one who exercises authority over the economic condition in the family.

[Question] Is this the only central question for women?

[Answer] No. The question of education remains [a central question]. The educational standard in Bahrain upon which the nation's level of consciousness depends [is still low]. There is still a high rate of illiteracy, and the question of women's education is still a basic question. There is also the problem of working women and where they work. Educational curricula and specializations for women are also limited. Not all areas, such as technical areas, for example, are open to women. This [restriction] may be linked to society's view of women as not suitable for this work but suitable for other work. Individual cases cannot be a standard [of measurement]. If matters other than those had been offered by education from the outset, the picture would have been different.

[Question] What about women's rights?

[Answer] We ask if working women are equal to men if they are equally competent? Have women achieved positions of leadership? They may have achieved administrative positions in the field of education, but this is on a limited scale. In my view women should have the opportunity to emerge within a leadership situation. We have the experience of Kuwait where officials are encouraging women in these leadership areas, and women there have reached the [rank of] undersecretary of a ministry.

[Question] What have women's societies in Bahrain offered for women and children?

[Answer] The number of societies is limited, and these are concentrated in the cities. I believe that [most] Bahraini women are out in these societies, and the small number of women who are members of these societies do not represent Bahraini women: 90 percent of Bahrain women are not members of these societies. There is a large percentage of women who need services. I am referring to [women in] the rural sector. In rural areas women are unaware and illiterate. Services must be focused on this sector. The need for the presence and creation of societies is urgent, but, unfortunately, the inclination to do so is not there.

[Question] What about children?

[Answer] The societies deliver their services to children through nursery schools and kindergartens. These services play a very small role since these nursery schools do not meet the standard that is required and hoped for. The societies' capabilities for covering services in this area are limited. A child's education during these formative years of his life require that school supervisors or teachers have certain levels of competence and at least a good standard of education.

[Question] To what extent are the educational curricula in the schools tied to the development of children's awareness?

[Answer] These curricula still need to be changed--they need a fundamental change. It is true that there has been a relative change between what we used to study and what exists now [in the schools]. The curricula in the first stages of education need fundamental change since the simple information that children are receiving is impervious to progress; it does not develop their awareness; and it does not examine their needs at this stage. The present scientific curricula are out of step with the current development in the sciences.

[Question] Are the objective and subjective conditions disposed to the establishment of a women's alliance?

[Answer] A women's alliance would be desirable. Everyone is aspiring for an alliance, but when and how such an alliance will be achieved remain problems that are tied to many things. The experience we had in the past--and I mean the 1975 experience of establishing an alliance--is still on people's minds.

Before making such a proposal, we must correct the negative features of the previous stage, and we must work at the outset to create a model, even if it is a simplified model, that would constitute a nucleus for such an alliance.

[Question] You said that the 1975 experience failed? What were the reasons for the failure?

[Answer] If the societies and the official agencies truly intended to establish such an alliance, the experiment would have been completed successfully. What happened was that we were faced with obstacles [which we had to overcome] to achieve this alliance, and these obstacles led to its failure. I believe that these obstacles do not represent anything fundamental since they were focused on the form of the alliance. Would the alliance assume the form of an association or a confederation? What would be the level of representation and leadership? Will the societies have independent budgets or will these budgets be inflexible? I believe that the reasons for the failure were purely superficial.

These matters of form should have been overcome, and the societies should have been bigger than that. We find that the United Arab Emirates has a women's alliance even though feminist activity there is 10 years old, whereas we have had more than 25 years. If we were to propose the idea of an alliance now, will we overcome these negative aspects of the past? There has to be constant and continuing communication, coordination and cooperation so that a certain view of this alliance can be formulated and a solid background for the establishment of this alliance that is hoped for can be created.

[Question] Among the results of the second women's conference in the Gulf was the formation of a coordinating and follow-up committee to implement the demands of the conference. What are these demands? What is your view of the coordinating committee, and what questions must it

focus on? Finally, what is your opinion of the elections of Bahrain's representatives to this committee?

[Answer] The conference did not issue recommendations. The only thing that came out of the conference was the formation of a coordinating and follow-up committee for the purpose of working to create a kind of Gulf community; to follow up on the activities of women's societies in the Gulf and in the countries that have no women's societies or alliances; to unify these societies; and to create feminist committees.

[Question] What is your view of the coordinating committee?

[Answer] It should focus on the questions of working women, such as the Personal Status Law and the status of the legislation that pertains to women. I believe that these questions are undoubtedly fundamental. This has been a good conference, and it gave some kind of incentive for the creation of some kind of joint action on the level of the Gulf.

[Question] How would you comment on Bahrain's delegates to the conference?

[Answer] My personal opinion is that the problem of candidacy was improperly handled. The societies were also wrong since we did not meet together to coordinate [our ideas] regarding having the societies nominate one person to represent the national sector at this conference. I believe that the societies have their excuse for not coordinating this matter because of the limited number of meetings. The fact that the ministry selected the candidate for the societies is something that it does not have the right to do even though the candidate of our society was the one who was selected. This method should have been rejected, and this was what was presented to the general assembly of our society.

[Question] What is your opinion of the phenomenon of the veil, and what does it mean to you?

[Answer] This phenomenon may be connected to the Islamic expansion in the area. But to what extent is this veil practical or positive? Frankly I think that the veil in this manner does not represent anything that is essential. Any girl or woman can dispense with this veil by her respectable clothing and her poise. Does the veil mean that the one who wears it is the ideal woman, the true Muslim or the example that is to be followed?

Taking the veil is not a matter of appearance. This phenomenon has been exaggerated and is beginning to become extensive. The matter of taking the veil began with women wearing a simple head cover. [This practice] has now changed into a variety of forms, and it has become unsuitable to the development of the age.

[Question] What does the murder of black children in the United States mean to you?

[Answer] The murder of black children in the United States can only be

described as pure racism. This is a social phenomenon whose roots go back to a time when some people were growing up with such ideas which then became a part of them. American society has grown up with this phenomenon, which is of course a grave, sickening phenomenon that must be fought by all means so this drain can be stopped. We heard about the precautions that have been taken to protect the black children in the United States, but I believe that they fall short of what is required to preserve the lives of these children.

[Question] As a cultural community, what has the Alumnae Club offered?

[Answer] This club has a large group of select people, and so far it has not offered what it should have. The recreational aspect prevails [over its activities], and its services are limited. It has no ties with reality, and none of its activities, which are few and far between, such as the cultural week, for example, do not bear the imprint of the members of this club since these members seek help from and attract [the members of] other organizations so as to raise their own educational activity. The name, the Alumnae Club, must be changed because it does not serve its purpose.

[Question] What do you think about the population census?

[Answer] Generally, the population census in any country is a good phenomenon that is not to be taken lightly. Through this census process it is possible to find out numerous aspects about the social side and the standard per capita income.

But the result of the census in Bahrain was unsettling in that it raised questions. The ratio of foreigners was high compared to the number of the population. I believe that these foreigners constitute a heavy burden that cannot be taken lightly.

[Question] As a citizen, how do you explain the phenomenon of fatal traffic accidents?

[Answer] I attribute these daily and fatal traffic accidents in many cases to the congestion of the roads and the large number of cars that are discharged daily onto our streets. I attribute it to the absence of suitable roads that can solve this crisis and to the absence of bridges that [pedestrians] can use instead of taking a risk by walking in the middle of the street and facing certain death. Besides, some of the drivers consume alcohol while they drive; they drive at a fearful speed and they are not careful. There is also no harsh punishment for all those who are not careful with the lives of others.

A law does not solve the problem and does not eradicate it. It is not a panacea to every drunk driver.

[Question] What about marriage to a foreign man or a foreign woman?

[Answer] The phenomenon of marriage to a foreign woman or a foreign man is undesirable because it lacks the important fundamentals of building and establishing a family life. No matter how ideal such a marriage may be, it will have barriers that will be difficult to overcome psychologically or socially. I do not encourage such marriages.

I believe that so far we have not heard of cases on a large scale that succeeded in the desired manner. There may be individual cases, but in general this is very difficult.

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COMMODITY, FUTURES MARKET TO START OPERATING

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL No 228 in Arabic 20 June 81 p 72

[Article: "The Economic Future: A Regional, Developing Money Market in Bahrain"]

[Text] As of the first of next July Bahrain will become the center for the first futures commodity exchange in the Arab world. People who wish to conduct business in this market may effect futures transactions on numerous goods and materials, beginning with gold, silver and precious metals and ending with fruits, for example. The market will naturally include primary materials.

Operations on this exchange will begin after the Currency Institute in Bahrain completes setting the bylaws for the exchange and for those who work in it. Each organization which intends to pursue activity on the exchange has to obtain a license from the Bahrain Currency Institute.

Among the rules of the new law is that those who conduct transactions on the exchange will be allowed to trade in futures on their own behalf or on behalf of others. Corporations of the free banking zone in Bahrain will be allowed to trade with Bahrain residents and non-residents, provided that the volume of precious metals transactions results no less than 200 ounces for gold and 5,000 ounces for silver.

Whereas the law bars middlemen from trading in metals and precious commodities on a principal party and it also bars them from holding on to sale or futures options on the aforementioned minerals, the same law requires them to submit monthly reports and detailed annual statements about their activities to the Bahrain Currency Institute which considers never control of the exchange to be one of the conditions for its success.

Among the conditions imposed on corporations that wish to work on the exchange we agree in that their paid capital must not be less than half a million Bahrain dinars (1.3 million dollars) and that they submit to the Bahrain Currency Institute a bank security worth 250,000 Bahrain dinars (650,000 dollars).

The regulations also stipulate that in considering any application from any agency wishing to work as an agent, the Bahrain Treasury should consider the position, the reputation, the ownership and the management of the applicants. It should also consider his experience, the integrity of his management (practices), his financial strength, a record of his revenues and how long he has been in the business of trading in precious metals, provided that priority be given to the agents who are doing business and who are registered in the commodities exchanges that are recognized in international stock exchanges.

The purpose behind all these regulations is naturally the protection of investors and avoid from random risks and speculations which have burned many in the past, most recently in 1979 and 1980.

Within this context, those who are observing the progress of this process are wondering about the degree of success this market will achieve and about the period of time that is necessary for that. To answer this question officially provide the following comments:

1. A certain period of time has to pass before users and investors can become accustomed to shift their operations from the international futures exchanges in New York, London, Paris, Hong Kong and Zurich to the new Bahrain exchange.

2. This period cannot be a brief one, especially since the margin that are claimed from customers in cover futures transactions in the Bahrain exchange exceed similar rates that are claimed in other international exchanges. The margin for gold transactions has been set at 6,000 Bahrain dinars--that is, more than 15,000 dollars--or 30 percent of the value of the transaction, whereas the margins for silver transactions have been set at 3,000 Bahrain dinars--more than 15,750 dollars.

3. There fore signify that Bahrain's success in turning to a real futures commodity exchange or to a regional stock exchange will require a period that is no less than 2 years.

But it appears that Bahrain enjoys equal the success of this exchange to be guaranteed. It constitutes the addition of a new and an important quality to the attributes of the money market in Bahrain which now has a trouble system, a free discount rate and a free banking area in which a growing banking and financial market has been created. In addition, Bahrain's economic, industrial and commercial activity is expanding and is likely to grow further because of the open-door policy that is in effect among the Gulf countries.

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Gulf Daily Net

COMMENTS ON EXPULSION OF ROK DIPLOMATS

LD0807043 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 8 Jul 81

[Unattributed Commentary]

[Text] Once again the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken a decisive step in cutting off the hands of the agents of American imperialism by expelling a number of employees of the South Korean Embassy. These persons, seemingly diplomats, were declared persona non grata and told to leave the country. Meanwhile, relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the regime of South Korea have been reduced to the charge d'affaires level. Iran's relations were at this level, but after the occupation of the American den of espionage by the Muslim student followers of the Imam's policy and the closure of the British and Canadian embassies, South Korea secretly took on their responsibilities and maintained relations with Iran at the level of ambassador.

Today, spying through diplomatic channels is one of the most common practices of the superpowers and the countries under their domination. In fact, embassies have gradually reduced their diplomatic duties and have become engaged in collecting secret information and in spying. Both the Eastern and Western imperialists are making use of various diplomatic methods and have engaged their ambassadors, charges d'affaires and secretaries of their embassies in spying. It should be borne in mind that if the true nature of the dealings of the embassies of the leading imperialist nations is divulged, the regimes under their domination take over the duties of their masters and continue exactly the same acts.

It is because of this that each day a number of diplomats of the world-devouring regimes are expelled as spies from various countries and their contacts arrested. Recently, an espionage network was discovered in the American Embassy in Zambia, which led to the expulsion of a number of its so-called diplomats. Somtime ago, an extensive espionage network was discovered in Mozambique. It was revealed that secret information concerning liberation guerrillas in South Africa had been passed to the racist regime via this American Embassy network. Stealing secret documents on Leopard II tanks by Soviet diplomats in West Germany is another example.

However, the most clear-cut case was discovered in Iran. After the occupation of the den of American espionage, the documents seized made absolutely clear that the American diplomats were spies. Therefore, with the closure of this extensive network their local agents were also arrested and exposed, among whom was 'Abbas Amir-Entezam, the spokesman of the provisional government. Sometime after the occupation of the American den of espionage the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Iran was also expelled for spying. It should be noted that this embassy's local agent was Ra'ahati, a member of the Nemaeyeh-e Khalq (Mujahedin-e Khalq), who has been jailed.

It has been made abundantly clear that both superpowers rely upon spying through diplomatic channels. It should also be noted that, according to the U.S. State Department's organization chart, a first secretary of an embassy is a CIA official who engages in spying under the title of the first secretary. It should also be borne in mind that each superpower has a number of countries under their domination with whom they have a master-servant relationship. After the spies of these masters have been expelled, these countries assume their responsibilities and continue their intelligence work. In the Islamic Iran, following the occupation of the American den of espionage, and the closure of the British, Canadian, and Egyptian embassies, this duty was entrusted to South Korea, or more so that this embassy, determined to carry out its duties in the best possible way, expanded its activities in various dimensions and even went over certain religious sensitivities. It would be a good thing if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would publish some examples of the offenses of the expelled members of the South Korean Embassy so that the true nature of their activities would be exposed.

The South Korean regime, which at the moment is under the military leadership of Chun Tu-hwan, has its own intelligence organization, the KCIA which was founded by Pak Chung-hsi, the former president who was assassinated by agents of the present rulers. The South Korean regime is one of those most dependent upon America. It rules over the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, which was occupied by American forces after World War II. The American influence in South Korea increased after the Korean War to the sixties, so much so that at present there are more than 30 American military bases there. The KCIA, is in fact a branch of the American espionage organization, the CIA. Its founder, General Pak Chung-hsi prided himself in having been able to found an organization similar to the CIA. General Chun Tu-hwan, the present South Korean president, is head of this organization.

Such spying activities carried out under a diplomatic guise show how these countries violate legal principles and how they show their disrespect for the host country. The true nature of the South Korean regime has been repeatedly manifested in its handling of various incidents, especially the events of last year in Kwangju, which left thousands of dead and wounded. The existence of 14,000 American soldiers in that country demonstrates South Korea's great dependence upon the western imperialist. By resorting to such inhuman and unprincipled methods, its relations with other nations has been severed and it will become isolated like the South African regime and the Israeli.

The three diplomats who have been ordered to leave Iran were not spying for South Korea, but for America. South Korea has no interest in the Islamic Iran and carries no weight in international politics. The South Korean dictatorial military regime has proved to the oppressed people of the world and to those who have risen against tyranny and it defends American interests and does not take a step without orders from the United States. Even during the war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, South Korean soldiers engaged in massacring the people of those countries under the command of the Americans, and were used as mere toys in the hands of their American rulers. In Iran, the South Korean Embassy endeavored to take the place of the American den of espionage. The expulsion of the three spy diplomats indicates that the spying policies of these two countries follow the same lines. With these activities, the South Korean regime has trampled all international regulations and has proved to the Muslim Iranian nation that they are not trustworthy guests. This regime was very close to the court of the deposed shah and had very close relationships with him. This relationship developed at the orders of their mutual master, America, after the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Even after its true nature was revealed, it was still accepted as a guest by the heroic and martyr-nurturing Iranian nation. The Muslim Iranian nation accepted the diplomats of South Korea by closing its eyes to South Korea's plundering activities in Iran. However, due to their abject and dependent nature, they misused this kindness and forgiveness and continued the path of their criminal master, a master whose nature has been made clear to all the oppressed people of the world.

It is hoped that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Iran and its new minister will supervise the activities of embassies and diplomats of various countries, especially those which are dependent upon the imperialists, and not allow any regime to misuse the hospitality of the Iranian people, to carry out acts of espionage safeguarding the inhumane interests of the world imperialism, led by criminal America, or to implement the treacherous plots of the world-devourers.

CSO: 4540/36

ARTICLE ON BANI-SADR'S PRESIDENTIAL DISMISSAL

Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Jun 81 p 4

[Article by Eric Rouleau: "The Reaction That Will Lead to President Bani-Sadr's Dismissal Seems to Have Begun"]

[Text] Tehran--Has the reaction that will lead to Mr Bani-Sadr's dismissal begun? Close collaborators of the chief of state do not doubt that this is so. The only question is whether he will be forced to resign or be removed from office.

The turning point was reached on Wednesday, 27 May. Imam Khomeyni, who until that day seemed to have assumed a neutral, if not ambiguous, attitude in the conflict that set the PRI [Islamic Republican Party] against Bani-Sadr, took a stand against the chief of state. The "guide of the revolution" is not in the habit of naming names, but his statements were apparently directed against Bani-Sadr. He said that the Majlis (Parliament) is the nation's highest authority and that whoever challenges its decisions will be presented by the people as a "corrupt being on earth." "The nation," the imam went on to say, "opposes personality cults, any man who transforms himself into a dictator through the exercise of his power." "I would with all my power rise up against anyone who deviates from the precepts of Islam," he added, "and those who are dissatisfied need only return to Europe, the United States or anywhere else." Bani-Sadr had lived in exile in France for 17 years during the shah's rule.

A few hours after Imam Khomeyni's speech, the Supreme Court called on the president to provide it with a detailed inventory of his assets, reminding him that, according to the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution, all leaders are obliged to report their personal property before and after their term of office.

Five days later, on 1 June, the Tripartite Conciliation Commission, established last March to arbitrate differences between the chief of state and the PRI, by name and for the first time accused Bani-Sadr, blaming him for having maintained a state of agitation in the country, particularly by making controversial speeches, and for having violated the Constitution. Two extremely serious charges since they refer almost word for word to Imam Khomeyni's statement of 17 March in which the latter threatened to punish anyone guilty of such actions. In that same communique the tripartite commission, moreover, announced that Bani-Sadr's "file" had been turned over to the Supreme Court for consideration. The latter has the right to impeach the chief of state, which would open the way to his removal from office.

"They wouldn't dare to impeach me," Bani-Sadr told us. Throughout the interview the Iranian president displayed the assurance of a military leader on the eve of a battle he is getting ready to win. "All this country's institutions — Parliament, the government [word(s) possibly missing], the Supreme Court, which is dominated by the PRI — have decided to step up the war of attrition they have been constantly waging against me. But I will win out because the people, who know that I am right, are behind me."

The president disputes the representativeness, jurisdiction, legality or impartiality of various state administrative bodies or agencies which are challenging him. He has carefully avoided naming Imam Khomeyni, whose portrait on a wall in his office is flanked by that of Mossadegh, the nationalist leader of the 1950's, little appreciated by advocates of the Islamic revolution. But he does not hesitate to lay the blame on those who benefit from the confidence of the "guide of the revolution."

The tripartite commission, composed of representatives of the Imam, the PRI and the president, has demonstrated that it has no intention of being indulgent as regards Bani-Sadr. It says that it has not taken action on some 50 letters he sent it to bring to its attention irregularities in or violations of the Constitution. But it, on the other hand, accuses him of having violated the Constitution by not signing a decree appointing President of the Council of Ministers Rajai interim minister of foreign affairs. Bani-Sadr claims that the Constitution gives him the right to refuse to confirm an appointment he does not approve of. The commission accuses him of paralyzing the functioning of the government.

In his eyes, the Supreme Court, which is getting ready to prosecute him for mal-administration, is not impartial either. "Ayatollah Beheshti," he said, "was appointed president of this court in violation of the Constitution as well as of the law that regulates the judiciary. The law prohibits the lumping together of these functions with that of a political leader." (Mr Beheshti is the chairman of the PRI.)

Despite everything, President Bani-Sadr has decided to comply with Ayatollah Beheshti's summons demanding that he provided a detailed inventory of his assets. An inventory he should have provided when he was elected president. "I felt it would be superfluous to comply since I intend to resign as soon as the war is over and since everyone knows that I am not a wealthy man .... All my wife and I have is a 50-square-meter apartment in Gachan (a Paris suburb) and 500,000 francs in liquid assets, while my daughters own two apartments in Tehran. It is also true that I have inherited several parcels of land, but they were occupied by poor farmers during the revolution,..."

Giant Versus Pigmy

The chief of state's arguments are far from convincing his critics who, in the press or on the radio or television, insist that the regulation was designed not only to evaluate the personal property of the nation's leaders — including Imam Khomeyni, since he was responsible for issuing it — but above all to detect illegal enrichment during the exercise of their official functions.

The debates now in progress could in the final analysis be chalked up to conflicting interpretations of the Constitution. The president's opponents accuse him of wanting to exercise the functions of head of the executive branch, which are not his to exercise, while behaving like the leader of the opposition. On the other hand, Bani Sadr accuses the PRI of trying to monopolize power by reducing its role to that of a "porcelain vase." Actually, although the president is elected through universal suffrage and is described as coming "after the Faqih (Imam Khomeyni), the highest authority in the nation," the Islamic republic's Constitution confers very broad powers on Parliament. The latter, for example, just as does the Supreme Court, has the power to recommend to the Faqih the removal of the president from office, whereas he can neither dissolve the National Assembly nor influence the decisions of the Islamic judges. That is, given the current balance of power, the combat now engaged in could well prove to be that of the giant versus the pigmy.

However, it does not seem as though — at least for the moment — they want to move for impeachment. According to some, the possible recall of President Bani-Sadr would involve the risk of creating a climate unfavorable to the conduct of the war against Iraq, the government's first objective. The chief of state has in fact crystallized about his person — one more criticism that has been lodged against him — all those factions opposing the regime, from the royalists to the "leftists," like the majoridic of the people, who support or make use of him as a standard-bearer. Bani-Sadr implicitly confirms this judgment by declaring that, for as long as he remains in power, he will constitute a "sort of dike" that will keep the "silent majority" from moving from protest against government policy to action against the Islamic republic. "My withdrawal from the political scene," he forcefully reiterated, "would be a denial of the will of the people and would provide the signal for a second revolution...."

Now the question is being raised as to how the crisis can be resolved. Bani-Sadr is determined not to confirm the appointment of Radjai as interim minister of foreign affairs. What would he do if Imam Khomeyni, whose "obedient son" he professes himself to be, were to demand that he sign the decree in question? "I would resign at once and I would explain the significance of my gesture to the people," he said. Barring just such a development, he said that he "would stick to his post no matter what the cost." And he concluded: "To cut down an oak, you have to begin by sawing it through...."

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GUARDS CAPTURE MOJAHEDIN SAFEHOUSES IN MASHHAD

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jul 81 p 9

[Text] Tehran, PARS NEWS AGENCY. Seven safehouses of counterrevolutionary groups have been discovered in Mashhad by revolution guards. At the same time, a number of armed persons of the Mojahedin-e Khalq and Cherikha-ye Feda'i Aqaliyat were arrested.

According to the PARS report, a number of edged weapons such as axes, jackknives, daggers, and brass knuckles as well as a film-developing apparatus, a movie camera, three copying machines, a duplicating machine, and a great number of announcements of this group were taken from the safehouse of those Cherikha-ye Aqaliyat, which was an elegant and expensive house in the Bone Shahr district of Mashhad.

The persons living in this safehouse, six of whom were men and two of whom were women, were destroying documents in a special container when they were arrested. According to this report, three hunting guns and air guns and a great number of announcements of this group backing Bani-Sadr were taken from three other safehouses which belonged to the Mojahedin-e Khalq. At the same time, eight persons, one of whom was a girl, were arrested.

Also, a safehouse of the Mojahedin-e Khalq on Abuzar Avenue in Mashhad was discovered by the self-sacrificing Guards of Islam and Followers of the Path of Hosayn.

Following the sending of the reports of suspicious activities to the revolution guards, this house was searched by order of the Public Prosecutor's Office, during which time were taken a great number of recent announcements of this group and documents showing that the occupants of this house were active in identifying members of the Revolution Guards Corps, Mobilization Headquarters and Hezbollahis.

According to this report, those persons, who were four in number and were not willing to reveal their identities, had been attacking the revolutionaries with arms after recognizing them.

Also, last Monday night, a safehouse of the Mojahedin-e Khlaq on Khajeh Rabi' Avenue in Mashhad was discovered by revolution guards of the Centre' Committee of the Islamic Revolution here.

According to the PARS report, the following things were found in this house: several thousand posters, a great number of publications and newspapers of this organization, many copies of announcements ready for distribution and a large quantity of consumer goods such as washing powder and rice. This same report indicates that in this case, two persons have been arrested, and one other person was pursued.

According to the PARS report, a safehouse of the Mojahedin-e Khalq on 'Adl-e Khomeyni Avenue in Mashhad was discovered by the revolutionary guards, from which a small truck load of prohibited publications was taken containing pronouncements supporting the deposed president. According to the PARS report, in connection with this, three persons were arrested and, after records were made on them, they were turned over to the authorities of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Islamic Revolution in Mashhad.

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GUARDS CAPTURE MOJAHEDIN COMMUNAL HOUSE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Jul 81 p 10

[Text] With the cooperation of the people of Tehran, a communal house of the Mojahedin-e Khalq was discovered in the early morning hours today by the brother revolution guardsmen. During the reconnaissance and clashes that lasted about six hours, three sympathizers of this organization were killed, and two others were arrested. It is being said that three occupants of the house escaped. According to this report, two were killed by the explosion of a handgrenade which they, themselves, had pulled the ring on. And the third person was killed by defenders of the Islamic Guard.

One of the brothers who was present in the six-hour incident told the PARS reporter that subsequent to the reconnaissance of this four-storey building on Ruzbehr Street off Palestin Avenue, a communal house of the Mojahedin was inspected, and security officers entered the apartment at 2130 hours, and two persons carrying handgrenades threatened the defenders of the Islamic Revolution, but the revolution guards succeeded in arresting them alive. At the same time, three Mojahedin who were in the basement of this house were killed in the explosion of a handgrenade they, themselves, had pulled the ring on. According to this report, a cache of weapons--such as Colts, Uzzis, and G-3 rifles, plus ammunition--was found in the basement of this safehouse. Likewise, books and pamphlets turned up which explained how to conduct partisan warfare.

During the arrest of the members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, a revolution guardsman was wounded.

CSO: 4940/39

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES SAID TO RESULT FROM RAID

London 8 DAYS in English No 25, 27 Jun 81 pp 2, 3

[Article by Russel Warren Howe]

[Text] ISRAEL'S RAID on the Tammuz reactor has afforded President Saddam Hussein the chance to win new friends in Washington with his usage of reasonableness under provocation. Then Israel hopes that the 7 June bombing — done with US-supplied planes — would stop Iraq's bid for better relations with America have been disappointed.

In the US, Iraq Foreign Minister Sadoun Hammadi and the US ambassador from Kirkpatrick managed to agree on the wording for a resolution. Partly written by the Irish delegate, Noel Dorr, it strongly condemned Israel, calling upon it to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and causing Iraq to appropriate redress for destruction acknowledged by Israel.

Israel has already said it will not pay up. But a senior member of Kirkpatrick's team points out that the cost of rebuilding Tammuz can be deducted from US grant aid to Israel and given to Iraq as an indirect compensation when full diplomatic relations begin again. This recognition was raised in the Hammadi-Kirkpatrick discussions, and is now expected to be an additional price for Israel's day of infamy.

According to a source close to US Under Secretary of State Walter Stoessel in special envoy Philip Habib has been ordered by Secretary Haig (away in Peking) to inform Premier Begin that any Israel attack on the Syrian missile sites in Lebanon would increase the current US public anti-Israel feeling and make a reappraisal of relations inevitable. Significantly perhaps, a White House statement on the Habib mission referred to the Syrian missiles, for the first time, as defensive.

The source close to Stoessel told 8 Days that Haig was concerned that the Tammuz raid could hamper both Habib's and Saudi peacemaking efforts, and risked increasing Soviet influence in the area. Begin, after first threatening to take out the Syrian missiles if Habib did not procure their withdrawal, later said there was no time bomb on the sequence.

Kirkpatrick, a conservative pro-zionist, was under constant instructions from Stoessel. He told Washington friends that he was being called six times a day from Peking to Haig, who had Kirkpatrick make the point to Hammadi that Washington and Baghdad were joint victims of Israeli arrogance.

A senior Reagan adviser told 8 Days that Haig had decided that Israel's explanation for the raid could not be trusted, after reading Begin's furious quotes from Saddam Hussein and from an Al Thawra article, saying the reactor was for use against Israel. Haig was also impressed by French and IAEA official assurances to the effect that Iraq had repaired all purchases of nuclear fuel and had rigidly observed IAEA safeguards — and that any attempt to produce weapons-grade plutonium would have triggered a French embargo and an IAEA report. (Israel has said it acted when it did because, after the reactor becomes hot, any attack on it would have radiated Baghdad and its environs.)

American officials also feel that the US is marginally responsible for the Israeli aggression because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not tell the State Department of an important meeting at the

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The U.S. delegate feared that Iraq might go for nukes, and still placed more [illegible] days, adding: "Now, if Iraq someone [illegible] take out Dimona, we could all breathe more easily." (Dimona is the nuclear power and bomb plant which Israel refuses to open to international inspection.)

Moderate Arab countries encouraged Iraq to go for a U.N. resolution which would pass unanimously. U.S. officials said response to the Israeli raid on Arab capitals, while strong, was less than expected. The conjectured attitude was seen as relieving the Iraqi view that the Israeli act of aggression could be turned to advantage.

But president Chaim Herzog, the Anti-League's ambassador to the U.N., was President Reagan's work for partly excusing the Israeli raid on the grounds that Iraq did not recognize Israel. This implied, Herzog said, that Israel had the right to bomb all Arab countries except Egypt, all African countries except South Africa and Morocco, and most of Asia.

TIES WITH AFRICAN UNDERGIRD STRENGTHENED

London 8 DATE in English No 25, 27 Jan 81 p 33

[Article by John Dinsdale]

[Text] [illegible] Vice-President Tariq Mazouni's visit of East Africa since the month has consolidated the relations established by a succession of state level Baghdad officials. Last month Mazouni toured West Africa, and the repeated assurances made to African capitals indicated that Iraq will help these developing countries that back the Arab struggle against Israel. And it is not only self-interest that is being offered: Iraq is also promising its support to all international forums the African could against apartheid in South Africa.

Mazouni began his extended visit to Tanzania President Abdou Diouf of Senegal who, after just two months in power, has declared his intention of embarking on a new and more open foreign policy. Diouf is a devout Muslim and support a reputation for being pro-conservative. Nonetheless, still a month his end. He appears determined to make Senegal's more pressing problems and more pressingly neighbours, on the development of industry and agriculture.

He must welcome the remarks offer of a new concessionary loan of $2 mln from the Iraqi Overseas Development Fund (IOEF), as his people will view it as evidence of his wisdom in rationalizing new friends overseas. The money will help pay for Senegal's imported oil and will allow the potentially rich West African state's economy to develop without the bank that has resulted in economies chaos for so many.

While it is unlikely that Senegal will loosen its traditional ties with France, observers believe that the Dakar government will now move closer to pan-Arab and Islamic circles.

The IOEF has also signed an agreement — on 11 June — advancing $10mln for the reconstruction of specific parts of Uganda's ravaged economy. This is not new money, but funds held in reserve since 1975. Like many other aid donors, Iraq suspended its programmes in Uganda five years ago — for reason of diverting the money earmarked for the country into other projects, placed in an dispute. Conditions are now considered to have changed to permit a revival. The increase is in addition to cash — promised by Iraq immediately after Idi Amin's overthrow — which is being used for a hydroelectric feasibility study.

Other recipients of Iraqi aid include Zimbabwe, where Baghdad has opened a permanent diplomatic post, and Zambia. President Kaunda's government is

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MEDICAL AID TO ARAB COUNTRIES OUTLINED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 23 May 91 p 2

[Text]

Iraq has been giving effective medical assistance and health aid to numerous Arab countries including implementation of direct health projects and provision of funds for other health projects.

Dr. Ibrahim Ahmed al-Nouri, undersecretary of the Ministry of Health told the Baghdad Observer that there existed manifold activity carried out by Iraqi health authorities to the benefit of arab citizens in several Arab countries.

Apart from assistance channelled through Arab League institutions and other joint undertakings, he said, Iraq continued to provide direct assistance to such countries as Lebanon, Yemen, Mauritania, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia.

Dr al-Nouri said that Iraqi representatives at the council of the Arab ministers of health "play effective role in deepening the health ties among Arab countries".

Iraqi representatives are to be found in the council's following committees: the national environment committee, the international health welfare committee, the health institutes committee, the radiological and nuclear medicine committee and the nervous system surgery committee.

These committees were assigned by the council of the Arab ministers of health to develop cooperation among the Arab countries and unify the laws and regulations, particularly in the field of public health.

Dr al-Nouri added that Iraq's pan-Arab health programme necessitated the posting of permanent medical representatives in the Arab Republic of Yemen, Djibouti and Somalia and the dispatch of Iraqi medical delegations between now and then to keep a close look at proper channeling of assistance to South Yemen and Mauritania.

Iraq has never turned down assistance request made by any Arab country involving health services to Arab citizens, said Dr. Al-Noori. Lebanon is among those Arab countries receiving continuous assistance including medical drugs and equipment.

Iraqi institutions allotted seats for arab students from Somalia, Djibouti, the Arab Yemen republic and Mauritania while at the same time it continued to provide direct financial assistance to various health institutions in the arab world.

Recent figures showed ID 34,000 having been contributed to the Arab fund for health development, ID. 26,000 to the budget of the Technicians Training Centre in Bahrain, ID. 43,000 to the Arab centre for research on accidents, ID. 90,000 to the anti-malaria fund and ID. 74,000 to the Arab Medical Statistics Council.

The official figures also showed ID. 68,000 having gone to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ID. 27,000 to the Arab Company for Drugs Industries. Funds were also contributed recently to the Red Cross Committee and other U.N. institutions.

Dr. Al-Noori said that Iraq continued to press for the transfer of the headquarters of the WHO Near East Regional Office from Alexandria to Amman in accordance with the Baghdad Arab summit conference resolutions.

The conference also resolved that all arab and regional health bodies and institutions which had headquarters in Egypt should be transferred to other Arab countries.

CSO: 4300/39

REVISED INITIAL CENSUS FIGURES REPORTED

Sana' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 12 Apr 81 p 5

[Article: " Apology and Correction". For related item see JPRS 78270 of 10 Jun 81, No 2345 of this series]

[Text] The great event which our people scored last Thursday through the good offices of the Public Federation of the Agencies for National Cooperation for Development, which was manifested in the honorable results of the cooperative population census, attracted attention and made us feel proud. We felt proud of the fact that many people had called to our attention the error in the tables which were published. The table on the capitals of the provinces was repeated instead of having one of the two tables be that of the general population for all the provinces of the republic. We apologize for the error. [Below] are the two tables which should have been published correctly, and may He who makes no errors be exalted.

Table 1: The Preliminary Results of the Cooperative Population Census of the Provinces of the Republic, Showing Gender Ratio and Ratio to the Total

The Number	The Province	Males	Females	Total	Gender Ratio	Ratio to Total
1	San'a'	989,373	767,598	1,756,971	129	21
2	Ta'izz	861,501	692,216	1,553,717	124	18
3	al-Hudaydah	593,642	493,866	1,087,508	120	13
4	Ibb	752,590	576,074	1,328,664	131	16
5	Dhamar	445,999	348,213	794,212	128	9
6	Hajjah	480,525	410,429	890,954	117	10
7	Sa'dah	184,552	151,917	336,469	121	4
8	al-Mahwit	163,236	132,977	296,213	123	3
9	al-Bayda'	172,969	147,010	318,979	117	4
10	Ma'rib	63,639	46,632	110,271	136	1
11	al-Jawf	46,864	36,152	83,016	130	1
Total		4,753,890	3,803,084	8,556,974	125	100

Table 2: The Preliminary Results of the Cooperative Population Census of the Provinces of the Republic, Showing Gender Ratio

The Number	The City	Males	Females	Total	Gender Ratio
1	San'a'	151,525	126,293	277,818	120
2	Ta'izz	66,221	53,352	119,572	124
3	al-Hudaydah	67,184	59,202	126,386	113
4	Ibb	19,029	15,256	34,285	125
5	Dhamar	22,229	17,686	39,915	126
6	Hajjah	11,981	14,039	26,020	85
7	Sa'dah	5,197	5,178	10,375	100
8	al-Mahwit	4,045	3,287	7,332	123
9	al-Bayda'	6,171	6,290	12,461	98
10	Ma'rib	75	57	132	131
11	al-Jawf	2,497	2,337	4,834	107
Total		356,154	302,977	659,131	117

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